Abstract-Phishing emails is growing at an alarming rate in this few years. It has caused tremendous financial losses to internet users. Phishing techniques getting more advance everyday and this has created great challenge to the existing anti-phishing techniques. Hence, in this paper, we proposed to detect phishing emails through hybrids features. The hybrid features consist of content-based, URL-based, and behaviorbased features. Based on a set of 500 phishing emails and 500 legitimate emails, the proposed method achieved overall accuracy of 97.25% and error rate of 2.75%. This promising result verify the effectiveness of the proposed hybrid features in detecting phishing email.
I. INTRODUCTION
Email has made the communication process become easier, faster and cheaper. It has became increasingly popular. However, phishing email is one of the major security threats. The phishing email can lead to financial loss. Attacker always sending email tends to make user believe that they are comminicating with trusted entity and deceive them into providing personal credentials in order to access service, such as credit card numbers, account login credential or identity information. Phishing email causes a serious threat to information security and internet privacy. Forrester Research that 20 percent of consumers refuse to open email or attachment even the email look legitimate, due to their loss of trust [9] .
According to APWG phishing attack trends reports [2] , the number of phishing email increase from 28,897 unique phishing reports in December 2009 to 45,628 unique phishing reports in December 2012. Phishing activity is growing at an alarming rate. Gartner survey December 2007 [7] estimated that phishing attacks $3.2 billion losses in business and 3.3 percent of consumers claim that they lost money because of email-based phishing attacks.
Many machine-learning techniques have been proposed in the literature to detect and filter phishing email. From an overview in previous work [1] shown that existing machine-learning techniques have limitation on consumes memory, consumes time, weak in detecting zero-day attack and feed continuously . Despite the constant improvement in anti-phishing techniques, phishers are more advanced to challenge existing anti-phishing techniques by introducing sophisticated techniques in order to bypass the detection. High changing rate of phishing attack techniques increase the difficulty of detecting and filtering phishing email attacks. Besides, the phishers are able to convince and deceive users by creating replica of a website that is identical to the original legitimate websites. User who is unfamiliar with browser security indicators can become a victim in these attacks.
In this paper, we enhance the method proposed in [8] by combining the URL-based, content-based and behaviorbased features. In order to extract the features, we analyse the email header information such as message-ID, sender email and return path. Analysing these information is rational as these information can not be easily camouflaged by phishers. Furthermore, email header is globally unique identification which is not visible to most users, but it is a useful indicator in determing where the message really originated from though routing information. The remainder of the paper is structured as follow. In the next section, we will discuss some of the related works. In Section 3 further discuss the proposed method. In Section 4 presents the experimental results and gives the analysis. In Section 5 conclude the paper.
II. RELATED WORK
Ease of communicating with advent of email has caused the problem of unsolicited bulk email, especially issues of phishing attacks through emails. Various anti-phishing techniques have been developed to solve the phishing attacks problem. Many email clients (eg. Thunderbird) have some sort of built-in junk filter, but it is insufficient to overcome the phishing email problem, due to the ever changing phishing attacks techniques.
Fette et al. proposed an email filtering approach called PILFER which considered 10 features set including URLbased and Script-based features to detect phishing attacks [5] . By filtering out phishing emails before it ever read by users can reduce the percentage of users being spoof. Even through PILFER gain high accuracy 96% and only 0.1% misclassify, but it focused on URL-based features which is not the best indicator. As phishers can obfuscate URL and make the URL look valid by using tools, such as TinyUrl. This make the outcome look unconvincing.
Phishers are becoming increasingly sophisticated in their approaches and also involve incorporate strategies to bypass existing anti-phishing tools. Shah et al. proposed a method which focus is to deal with the situation once a phishing email has been detected rather than only to filter the suspected emails [13] . Specifically, they proposed a proactive approach called Pshark which will terminate the phishers before the message reach user. When user open phishing link of an email, Pshark will perform whois query to retrieve host server information. Then, Pshark will report to the server administrator, so that administrator can take action to remove the phishing page. Apparently, the effectiveness is laid on the hand of the host server administrator. It is possible that the administrator is unaware to initial Pshark notification or the administrator is cooperating with the phishers which will render a failure for Pshark. Therefore, a more proactive of Pshark approach is needed to automatically remove the phishing page without depending on the host administrator.
Sanglerdsinlapachai et al. proposed anti-phishing tools which combine feature from Carnegie Mellon Anti-phishing and Network Analysis Tool (CANTINA) and homepage similarity features [12] . Homepage similarity features and URLbased features are used together with a machine learning method in order to detect phishing webpage. However, the feature extraction process for homepage-based feature requires to download webpages of both domain level and host level. Webpage level filtering is unable completely shield users from phishing attack because it lacks of contextual information which is useful to identify phishing emails.
Recently, more researches emphasized on behavior-based features extracted from phishing emails. Behavior-based feature is a feature that analyses the phishing email based on attacks characteristic. Phishers able to employ sophisticated techniques in order to make them look originally from trusted entity, but behavior cannot be easily disguised by phishers. Therefore, behaviors-based feature is useful when other features have been overcome by phishers. Example of researches that use behavior-based feature are [6] , [8] and [14] . There are 30 features have been discuss in [6] , almost 50% of the proposed features are behavior-based features. For example, counts the number of characters in the subject field and sender field, denotes the size of the email message in bytes, counts the number of pop-ups that are created by the links in the email message, counts the number of different domains that are linked from within the email and so on. However, [8] proposed a hybrid features set that combines behavior-based, URL-based and contentbased features to identify phishing emails. There are two newly proposed behavior-based features in [8] , which are unique sender and unique domain. Unique sender is binary data represent sender behavior whether the senders send emails from more than a single domain. Unique domain is binary data denotes if the domain names is used by more than one sender domain email. Both newly proposed behavior-based features claim a motivate result in detecting phishing email. Beside, [14] investigated 40 features that extracted from email message. Among the 40 features, some features are behavior-based features, such as counts the total number of distinct words occuring in the email body, counts the total number of characters occuring in the email body, measure the ratio of the number of words to the number of characters in the document, counts the number of onclick events in the email and so on. Table I shows comparison between existing works.
III. PROPOSED APPROACH
In this section, we present the details of our proposed hybrid features. The general framework is shown in Figure  1 . In order to test our model, we first run a set of scripts to extracts all the the proposed features from each incoming email and form a feature value. After that, the extracted 
A. Feature Extraction
Motivated by the work in [8] , we enhance the method by integrating additional features from previous work, [5] and [14] . The proposed approach consists of five email structurebased features and four sender behaviour-based features. Email structure-based feature contain domain sender, blacklist words in subject and content, URL IP address, URL dots and URL symbol. While sender behaviour-based features contain unique sender, unique domain, return path and hyperlink. The description for each feature is listed as below:
1) Domain sender: This feature measures the similarity between sender domain name and domain message-ID extracted from the email. Domain name is the unique name that appears after the @ sign in email address. For example, the domain name of service@paypal.com is paypal.com. Message-ID is a unique piece of text in email header, such as 2060000.1012684767@paypal.com. Domain message-ID is the domain name that appears after the @ sign in message-ID. For example, the domain message-ID of 2060000.1012684767@paypal.com is paypal.com. If domain name is same as the domain message-ID, the feature value will be 0, otherwise it will be 1.
2) Blacklist words in subject and content: The blacklist bags of words are collected by observing and analyzing the common properties and repository of phishing emails. Based on the works in [4] and [11] , a total of 30 blacklist words are used in this project to identify phishing email. The list is showed in Table II . If any of the blacklist keyword is in the email subject or content, this feature value will be set to 1, otherwise, it is set to 0. 3) IP address in URL: Some phishing websites are hosted on the compromised computer. These machines may not have Domain Name System (DNS) entries. DNS implements a distributed database to store host name and address information for all public hosts on the internet. DNS translates the domain name we type in web browser address bar to IP address of web server hosting the web site. Hence, the simplest way to detect phishing sites is by IP addresses. For example, http://192.168.0.1/paypal.cgi?fix\ account. This will be potential indication of a phishing website by detecting such a link in an email. We count the number of link with IP address in the email and normalized the value by using the formula as shown in section B. If the normalized value is bigger than threshold value, then set the feature value to 1, otherwise set it to 0.
4) Dot in URL:
Many phishers try to construct legitimatelooking URLs by manipulating subdomain or redirection script to confuse users. For example, the subdomain,http: //www.secure.login.paypal.com.yourphishbank.net may deceive user to believe it is a secure login URL for paypal website. Whereas for the redirection script, http://confirm-usa.visa.com/moveon/hhredir.jsp?rDirl=http: //211.177.185.29/.verified/ will redirect user to a phishing site. Normally, phishing URL will contain a large number of dots. Hence, capturing the number of URL with many dots in an email is a significant feature. We find and count the link in an email which number of dot is more than 5. After that we normalise this number using the formula as shown in section B. If the normalized value is greater than the threshold value, the feature value will be set to 1, otherwise the feature value will be set to 0.
5) Symbol in URL:
Sometime, the phishers will use URL obfuscation in order to confuse user, so that the user cannot distinguish the phishing URL and legitimate URL properly. For example, the phishing URL, http: //www.youraccount-maybank.com@accountexpirycheck.net will redirect user to accountexpirycheck.net page instead of maybank.com site. Although this deception has been overcome by most latest internet browser, but there are still many users who are using legacy browser and are potentially becoming the victims. In another way where the phisher can try to deceive the user is to encode some part of the URL with hexadecimal character codes which begins with % in order to hide fraudulent website address. For example, http://www.fastvisa.com\%00@: \%32\%34\%2e\%37\%36\%2e\%38\%39\%6E\%33, only shows the legitimate part, www.fastvisa.com in the address bar, but the actual referred website is @:%32%34%2e%37%36%2e%38%39%6E%33, which is the phishing website. We find and count the number of link with symbol (i.e., %, @ and &) and normalize it using the formula as shown in section B. If the normalized value is greater than the threshold value, the feature value will be set to 1, otherwise the feature value will be set to 0.
6) Unique sender:
This feature represents whether the sender sends emails from more than one domain. Basically, this feature uses the same principle as Domain sender feature which has been discussed in section A. We verify the uniqueness of domain message-ID to the email sender. If the emails were sent from the same sender (i.e., same email address), but with diferent domain message-ID, then it is not unique. We set the feature value to 1 if it is not unique, otherwise the feature will be set to 0.
7) Unique domain:
This feature represents whether the domain name is used by more than one sender. This feature determines if the emails that have the same domain message-ID are sent from the same sender. If the emails have the same domain message-ID, but with different sender, then it is not unique. We set the feature value to 1 if it is not unique, otherwise the feature will be set to 0.
8) Inconsistent hyperlink:
This feature measures the inconsistency between where the hyperlink actually leads to and the text of the hyperlink appeared to the user in an email. It is not uncommon for a phisher to deceive an unsuspecting user by providing a legitimate URL as a clickable text to a hyperlink, but in fact the hyperlink will direct the user to a phishing website when is clicked. For example, <a href =www.a-phishing-site.com>www.ebay.com</a>. We find such inconsistency hyperlink in an email and assign the value 1 to this feature if we find one or more inconsistent hyperlink. If all the hyperlinks are consistent, then we set the feature value to 0. The datasets are taken from two publicly available resources, which are [3] and [10] . [3] consists of legitimate sample data and [10] consists of phishing sample data. From this datasets, we have randomly selected 500 legitimate and 500 phishing emails for our experiments. We have chosen Support Vector Machine (SVM) as classifier for our experiments. It is the simplest and most widely used supervised learning model because of its effectiveness in high dimensional spaces and powerful in binary classification. The experiments use 60 percent of the dataset for training phase and the remaining 40 percent for testing phase.
Since the proposed method is enhancing the one proposed in [8] (abbreviated as HA), it is rational to benchmark the performance of proposed method to HA method. The results of comparison between the proposed method and HA method is shown in Table III . The proposed method achieves a better overall accuracy of 97.25% compared to HA method of 95.5%. Although the false negative rate for the proposed method is higher than HA method, but the proposed method manage to reduce the false positive rate from 8.5% to 4.5%. Note that it is important to have a method with high true negative rate because email user does not want a detector that is too strict until blocking some legitimate email. Recall of the proposed method is lower than the HA method of 0.5%. It shows that the proposed method have slightly dropped in completeness of detecting phishing emails. However, the proposed method has higher precision at 95.65% compared to the HA method, it shows that the proposed method has higher exactness in detecting phishing emails than the HA method. Although the proposed method has higher computation time than HA method, but it is only marginal compared to the higher detection accuracy achieved by the proposed method. The overall classification results have evidenced that the proposed hybrid features have improved HA method. In this paper, we have used 9 features, 7 features from [8] , 1 feature from [5] and [14] respectively. Among there 9 features includes structure-based and behavior-based features.They are domain sender, blacklist words in subject and content, IP address in URL, dot in URL, symbol in URL, unique sender, unique domain, inconsistent hyperlink and return path. All proposed features are selected based on phishing technique that commonly employ by phishers.
SVM has been chosen as the classifier in this paper. The proposed method obtains promising result and outperforms the HA method. It is noteworthy to mention that the effectiveness of unique sender and unique domain features are depended on the quality and size of corpus. Thus, it may cause time consume. There are some limitation on blacklist keywords feature, due to no up to date blacklisted keywords list. Current implementation does not consider the graphical element for the email which is in HTML form. This element is also equally important and one of our future works is to extra additional feature from graphical elements.
